

Report of the 2014 National Lawyers Guild Bolivian Election Observation Delegation

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**National Lawyers Guild
132 Nassau Street, Room 922
New York, NY 10038
Tel: 212-679-5100
Fax: 212-679-2811
www.nlg.org**

www.nlginternational.org

THE NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD

Founded in 1937 as an association of progressive lawyers, law students, and legal workers, the National Lawyers Guild (NLG) promotes human rights over property rights and has been engaged in international affairs since its inception. The NLG was one of the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) selected by the US government to represent the American people at the founding of the United Nations in 1945. Members helped draft the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in 1948 founded the International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL), one of the first UN-accredited human rights NGOs.

As a US-based organization, the NLG examines the historic and current roles the US government and transnational corporations play throughout the world. We document those roles, criticize them where appropriate, and ally with individuals and social movements that are struggling against US influence in their countries. In Latin America, our criticism of US government policies and abuses led to delegations in the 1980s to El Salvador to support human rights activists and to Nicaragua to support the Sandinista government under attack by the Contras at that time. In recent years, we have sent delegations to Cuba, Haiti, Venezuela, Bolivia, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and Colombia to support progressive social movements and to criticize what we consider to be misguided US policies. Some of our delegations focused specifically on human rights abuses, some have studied social movements, and some have observed elections.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The National Lawyers Guild expresses our deep gratitude to all the people whose time and energy made this delegation possible. Linda Farthing was instrumental in organizing and shepherding us through the trip, and her expansive knowledge of and affection for Bolivia were critical to our understanding of the historical and current context of the election. Thanks also to Lee Cridland of Volunteer Bolivia, Sara Shields, Reina Ayala, and Benjamin, Dario, and Don Victor, our drivers on election day. We also thank Rocío Jiménez and all the other speakers who shared their thoughts and wisdom with us.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Introduction	1
II. Significance of Evo Morales and the MAS Government	1
III. Electoral Developments.....	3
IV. Critiques of the TSE.....	4
V. NLG Observations on Election Day.....	5
a. Voting Process	5
b. Voting Experience.....	7
VI. 2014 Election Results.....	8
VII. Conclusion	9
APPENDIX A: Delegation Participants	11
APPENDIX B: Delegation Meetings in Bolivia.....	12

REPORT OF THE 2014 NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD BOLIVIAN ELECTION OBSERVATION DELEGATION

I. Introduction

A 12-member delegation from the National Lawyers Guild (NLG) went to Bolivia in October 2014 to observe that country's presidential and congressional elections and to meet with members of civil society. The NLG had previously sent a delegation to Bolivia in January 2007 to evaluate the transformative policies being adopted in the country. At that time, Evo Morales, Bolivia's first indigenous president, had been in office for just a year. We investigated a number of issues, including land reform, the role of indigenous populations in the new government, the partial nationalization of gas and oil, the reform of the constitution, the U.S. war on coca, the reaction of the Morales government to Washington's criticisms, and the reform of the legal system. A report detailing our observations during the 2007 delegation is available [here](#).

In October 2014, our goal was to participate as election monitors/observers to the extent authorized by the government, as well as to investigate the underlying conditions in which the election was taking place. Evo Morales was running for a third consecutive term at a time when his MAS (Movement Towards Socialism) government had consolidated control but faced challenges from both popular and traditional conservative sectors. During the week preceding the election we heard from attorneys, journalists, teachers, economists, environmental activists, governmental representatives, and others in order to provide our delegation with a contextual basis for understanding the elections. As a result, this report provides information about the electoral process as well as the context in which it took place.

In summary, despite some issues noted in this report, we found that the electoral process in Bolivia was a successful demonstration of democracy in action at both the local and national levels. We were impressed by the high degree of participation of Bolivian citizens who were randomly chosen to work in the polling centers, and by the equal participation of women and people from all economic and cultural backgrounds. The cooperation of citizens at all stages of the voting process was remarkable: from the set-up of the polling tables, to the conduct of the vote throughout the day—including a user-friendly ballot—to the transparent process of vote tabulation. From having attended an election worker training session in Cochabamba, we appreciated the level of knowledge required for implementing a somewhat complex voting process.

We recognized the broadly successful efforts of all participants to ensure a free, fair, and transparent election. The Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) directed a well-organized voting process. Public participation was high and our observer presence was welcome.

II. Significance of Evo Morales and the MAS Government

Evo Morales, an indigenous leader of the regional coca-growers union federation, was elected president of Bolivia on the Movement Towards Socialism (MAS) ticket in 2005, with a then-unprecedented 54% of the popular vote. The election had its origins in a series of historic

popular mobilizations: the 2000 Water Wars (in Cochabamba) and the 2003/2005 Gas Wars (in El Alto). These events led to the ouster of two successive neoliberal presidents and their eventual replacement by the new MAS “government of the social movements.”

Morales has proven to be a charismatic, successful, and immensely popular president. In 2009, he spearheaded the enactment of a new constitution drafted by a popular assembly, overcoming the opposition of conservative economic elites in four eastern departments (the “*Media Luna*”) whose secessionist threats had brought the country to the brink of civil war. The constitution refounded Bolivia as a plurinational state with a mixed private, public, and communitarian economy; reasserted state sovereignty over natural resources; and enshrined the principles of indigenous and environmental rights. It was approved by 61% of Bolivian voters in a popular referendum held on January 25, 2009.

Other landmark initiatives of Morales’s first term (2005-2009) include the favorable renegotiation of hydrocarbons contracts and the nationalization of other strategic sectors sold to private interests by past neoliberal governments, a major land redistribution program, and significant advances in political, economic, and social opportunities for Bolivia’s indigenous majority. Morales was re-elected for a second term in 2009 with 64% of the vote.

Under Morales Bolivia has experienced unprecedented political stability and economic prosperity. In a country known for frequent military coups and political turmoil, he is the longest-serving head of state. Morales’s prudent, macroeconomic policies have called for significant direction of the economy by the state. These policies have earned the praise of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and have delivered annual growth rates averaging more than 5%, a vast expansion of Bolivia’s international reserves, and a huge increase in the value of hydrocarbons and minerals exports.

Increased government income from hydrocarbons has contributed to improving the living standards of ordinary Bolivians. Popular cash transfer programs for the elderly, school children, and pregnant mothers have enhanced social mobility (while fueling domestic demand and furthering economic growth). During Morales’s tenure, poverty has been reduced by 25% and extreme poverty by 32%, one of the two largest reductions in Latin America. Morales is credited with delivering schools, housing, hospitals, soccer fields, and domestic gas connections to communities in virtually every corner of Bolivia. The spectacular new aerial cable car system connecting La Paz and El Alto was financed entirely from national savings, while the Túpac Katari satellite (financed through loans from China) has brought the internet to schools in the remotest regions. These highly visible symbols of modernization and prosperity have been popular with Bolivians at home, while garnering significant attention abroad.

Outside Bolivia, Morales has played an important leadership role in alternative political and economic institutions that are providing the basis for regional cooperation without US interference. These include the Community of South American and Caribbean States (CELAC, a hemispheric alternative to the US-dominated Organization of American States (OAS)), the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR, a regional development bank), and MERCOSUR, a regional trade alliance. Along with Ecuador and Venezuela, Bolivia has rejected the free trade agreements which have had a disastrous effect on other Latin American economies, as well as

loans from the World Bank and IMF. In addition, Morales is widely regarded as a champion of indigenous and environmental rights on the international stage, and has played a leading role in the struggle for climate justice, including hosting the World People's Conference on Climate Change in Cochabamba in 2010.

Still, Morales and the MAS in recent years have disappointed many former supporters. A common concern is the centralization of power within the MAS party leadership in its drive for political hegemony, resulting in a loss of accountability to grassroots members and to allied social movements, along with a diminishment of their autonomy. Now a strong national party, the MAS has become a powerful corporate-style organization, rooted in popular, union, indigenous, territorially based, and, increasingly, business sectors in every region of the country. It controls all three branches of government as well as the TSE (the Supreme Electoral Tribunal), 280 of 335 municipalities, and the governorships of seven of Bolivia's nine departments.

At the same time, the party's constituent base has become more fragmented, with significant right-wing elements—including members of the Santa Cruz agribusiness and ranching elites and ex-leaders of the old conservative neoliberal parties—now incorporated under the MAS umbrella. Consistent with this trend, in the 2014 electoral campaign the MAS emerged as more of a centrist than a leftist party, a “big tent” coalition of interests with a moderate program focused on modernization, technology, and development. This has raised concerns about the future progressive direction of what Bolivians call their “process of change.”

Finally, Morales's growing reliance on extractive industries to finance the government's popular economic and social programs represents a continuing contradiction. In the months preceding the election, Morales revived the controversial TIPNIS highway plan, announced the expansion of hydrocarbons exploration to the national parks, and signed a new mining law that permits water to be diverted from local farming communities to mining operators—while continuing to champion environmental and indigenous rights abroad. These policies have generated a major rift between Morales and the indigenous, environmental, and human rights organizations that criticize extractivism.

In 2013, in a controversial ruling, the Plurinational Constitutional Court (TCP) held that Morales could run for a third consecutive presidential term, despite the constitutional provision allowing for only two terms. The TCP ruled that Morales's first mandate, which began before the 2009 Constitution was adopted, did not count towards the term limit restrictions under the new Plurinational State. The ruling paved the way for Morales's entry into the 2014 electoral race (a decision viewed by some as violating a pact made by Morales with opposition leaders in 2009 in exchange for their agreement to support the new constitution).

III. Electoral Developments

In the 2014 elections, Bolivians voted for a President and Vice-President and also for representatives to the Plurinational Legislative Assembly, choosing from candidates running on five political party slates.

Bolivia's Plurinational Legislative Assembly is bicameral with a 130-member Chamber of Deputies and a 36-member Senate, made up of four senators from each of the nine departments. Sixty-three delegates to the Chamber of Deputies come from uninominal districts, where the delegates are elected directly by voters through a simple majority vote. Sixty delegates come from plurinominal districts, whose seats are awarded based on each party's proportion of the vote in the Presidential contest. The remaining seven deputies in the lower chamber come from specially designated indigenous districts, where voters have the option of electing candidates chosen through "usos y costumbres" (traditional community decision-making practices). The senate seats are awarded based on the proportion of the presidential vote, like the plurinominal deputies.

The 2014 elections were the first presidential and congressional elections to be held under the jurisdiction of the Plurinational Electoral Body (OEP), established by the 2009 Constitution as a fourth branch of government. The OEP consists of the seven-member Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE), nine departmental electoral tribunals, electoral judges, and individuals who are randomly selected by the TSE to facilitate and tally the vote at local polling places. Six members of the TSE are elected by the Plurinational Assembly, and one is designated by the President. The OEP and TSE officially replaced the National Electoral Court (CNE) as Bolivia's supervisory electoral body in August 2010, in time to oversee the judicial elections held later that year.

A transitional electoral law passed in April 2009, shortly after adoption of the new constitution, mandated implementation of a new biometric electoral registry. Although it seemed doubtful at first that the CNE would be able to carry this out, they were in fact able to register more than 5.1 million voters using a system that incorporates digital fingerprints, a signature, and photographs of each registrant, in time for the election. For the 2014 elections, the TSE implemented a substantial outreach program throughout the country and expanded the biometric registry to include nearly 6 million voters.

In 2009, Bolivian citizens living abroad were able to register and vote for the first time, as mandated by the new constitution, but only in four countries (Argentina, Brazil, Spain, and the US). In 2014, voting procedures were established for all registered voters outside the country, with an estimated 272,000 Bolivians in 33 countries included on the registry.

The 2009 Constitution also mandated the principle of "gender parity" for women in Bolivia's political and electoral systems. For the first time, the 2014 electoral law extended this requirement to the selection of congressional candidates, requiring specific rules for alternating candidates in the uninominal districts and equal representation in party slates for plurinominal and senate candidates.

IV. Critiques of the TSE

In the months and weeks preceding the election, and after the vote, the TSE's policies and practices were strongly criticized by opposition leaders who alleged that the Tribunal was manipulating the election results in favor of the MAS. Opposition parties complained that local legislative districts were being redrawn to disproportionately benefit rural voters, who

overwhelmingly favored the MAS. The TSE defended its actions based on the recent population census.

The TSE was also criticized for allowing MAS to exploit the advantages of incumbency through publicly-financed promotional activities by government ministries, while simultaneously restricting television spots that would increase the visibility of lesser-known parties. The TSE fined the MAS \$20,000 when Morales, ahead of the date when electoral propaganda was legally permitted, introduced a slate of MAS candidates at a public works inaugural event. The MAS paid the fine, Morales declaring that the campaign publicity was worth the cost.

The TSE was again called to task when 20,000 deceased voters' names were found on the authorized registry, including some who had been designated as electoral jurors (i.e., to play official roles in the elections). The TSE attributed the problem to recent deaths and a lack of coordination with the civil registry, which was subsequently made available to electoral officials at the voting centers.

An embarrassing problem arose when a misprint on the TSE-commissioned ballots—the substitution of “plurinominal” for “plurinational” state—went unnoticed until Election Day. The TSE blamed the error on the printer and determined that the validity of the election results would not be affected.

The most serious problem occurred after the vote, when a blackout of the computerized election results lasted for several days. While the TSE had promised 70% of the results by midnight on Election Day and 90% by the following day, only 3% were delivered within the committed timeframe.

The Morales government was quick to criticize this failure of transparency, calling for a multiparty audit and a restructuring of the TSE. Unlike similar election night blackouts occurring in other Latin American countries (e.g., Mexico in 1988) that have prompted major accusations of electoral fraud, no such allegations or suspicions were raised in this case.

V. NLG Observations on Election Day

On Election Day, the polls were open for voting from 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. NLG delegates observed from early morning, during the set-up of the voting tables, until the end of the vote count. We divided ourselves into three groups and visited nine polling centers: four in La Paz, two in El Alto, and three in Achacachi, a primarily indigenous community near Lake Titicaca. In total, these voting centers had 238 voting tables serving 54,623 voters.

a. Voting Process

The voting process was carried out through the use of large paper ballots, divided into two main sections. The top portion was used to elect the President and Vice-President (and, indirectly, the proportional representation-based election of plurinominal deputies and senators). The bottom portion was used to elect the uninominal deputies. All parties participating in the election were

shown in the same order from left to right on both portions of the ballot. The boxes for each candidate/party were of equal size.

All party candidates were listed with their names and photographs to accommodate any voters with difficulties seeing or reading. Voters made their selections by checking the small boxes below the candidates' photos. Any mark was considered valid so long as the voter's intent was clear to those tallying the votes. However, if a mark intended for one candidate extended into the area of another candidate, that vote was considered null. Likewise, if someone attempted to vote for more than one candidate in either the top or bottom portion, every vote within that portion was considered null.

Each registered voter was assigned alphabetically to vote at a particular table ("*mesa*") at their designated polling location.

Polling places, usually schools or other public buildings, were widely dispersed throughout the country. "*Notarios*" (notaries) designated by the TSE were present at each polling location to provide logistical and operational support to all voters and voting tables at that location. "*Jurados*" (electoral jurors) presided over the voting tables and tallied the actual votes. They were randomly selected from among registered voters assigned to that *mesa*, much like the process for jury duty in the United States. A new group of voters is chosen to serve as *jurados* for each election. Service on the electoral jury panel is open to all voters and is obligatory, unless the voter has a valid excuse. Two-thirds of the members of each panel are required to be literate and not elderly.

For each *mesa*, six *jurados* (including three alternates) then decided who would function as president, secretary, and "*vocale*" (member). They divided up the required tasks based upon those positions. At least three *jurados* were required to be present at all times for the table to function.

The *jurados* at each *mesa* were responsible for setting up the table and making sure that all the required materials (ballots, ballot box, envelopes for tallied votes, etc.) were accounted for and properly prepared. They oversaw the voting process at their table: they checked for each voter's name on the registration list, checked each voter's identification, watched each voter sign next to their name, handed out ballots to one voter at a time, and ensured that each ballot was properly placed inside the table's ballot box.

Each table functioned largely independently from the others. After the polls closed, the *jurados* at each table examined each ballot and tallied the votes for all the candidates. The *jurados* decided if a particular vote was considered null due to any irregularities in the markings on the ballot. This tally was done manually, usually on a blackboard, as most of the voting centers were located in schools. The process of tallying each ballot was transparent and open to the public for observation.

After the tally was complete, the information from the blackboard or worksheet was transferred onto a master sheet ("*acta*") for the table that was then signed and thumb-printed by all the *jurados*. Each *acta* had multiple carbon copies, the first of which was delivered to the *notario*

who was responsible for delivering it to the departmental TSE headquarters for scanning and transmission to the national TSE. The second copy went to the president of the *mesa*, and other copies went to each political party that had a representative present. The ballots, worksheets, and remaining *actas* for the tables were then sealed in designated envelopes, which were collected by the *notarios* for each polling location and delivered to the TSE departmental headquarters. The scans of all of the *actas* were then posted on the TSE website along with the vote tallies.

b. Voting Experience

In most respects, Election Day appeared to be a model of local democracy in action, with notable differences from the US voting process. Elections are held on Sundays that are declared national holidays. All regular business is shut down to encourage voter turnout. Voting is compulsory--with non-excused abstention punishable by a hefty fine--as well as highly participatory. To encourage unbiased reflection, campaigning is prohibited for 72 hours ahead of the election, and the consumption of alcoholic beverages is outlawed for 48 hours. Motorized transportation and domestic flights are banned in order to prevent double voting, a concern in part because of those who maintain dual residency in the city and countryside.

As such, La Paz and other major cities experienced a mass exodus on Saturday as many citizens returned to vote in their rural communities of origin. At dawn on Sunday, the roads were eerily devoid of vehicles, but clogged with pedestrians and bicyclists, some traveling for several hours to reach their voting destinations. Although the new national biometric voting registry, which includes voters' photos and fingerprints, would now seem to obviate the need for these onerous travel restrictions, most voters appeared to take the travel in stride.

NLG delegates observed the *jurados* setting up their *mesas* and organizing their materials in preparation for the day's vote. The *jurados* signed and placed their thumbprint on each individual blank ballot in advance to validate the authenticity of each ballot to be provided to voters. The process was very transparent, with the *jurados* unfolding each ballot and showing observers that that the ballot was not pre-marked.

Approximately half of the *jurados* at each center were women (i.e., half the *mesas* had 2 out of 3 *jurados* who were women and half had 2 out of 3 who were men). About half of the *notarios* also appeared to be women, both at the polling places that we visited and at the regional TSE in Cochabamba. We observed many female *jurados* wearing traditional clothing and carrying babies on their backs in Bolivia's traditional *aguayos*.

Some of the polling places we visited were not fully prepared at the opening time of 8:00 AM, but were set up shortly thereafter. We observed that the polling places in less affluent areas had crowded rooms and long lines, while those in more affluent neighborhoods were more sparsely populated and orderly.

We observed some initial confusion as voters tried to identify their voting *mesas*, especially at sites where voting lists were posted late or in inaccessible locations. Not all *notarios* wore identifying vests, leaving voters confused about where they could find assistance, and some were more helpful than others. Some *mesas* had the name of the *notario* posted on a sign on the wall,

but many did not. However, over time it appeared that voters were able to locate the appropriate *mesa*.

Understaffing appeared to be a problem at many centers, particularly in less affluent neighborhoods, with the limited number of *notarios* unable to handle the volume of requests for assistance. In rural locations, only two *notarios* were assigned to large centers, and only one had access to a computer and internet service. Although some *notarios* set up small tables to answer questions and provide directions, there were not enough. In some cases, *notarios* were not properly identified or could not be easily located.

We noted that many sites had *mesas* on upper levels of schools, making it difficult for the elderly and those with disabilities to vote. On a few occasions we observed *jurados* from an upper-level *mesa* bringing voting materials down to the first floor to accommodate an elderly person or a voter with a disability.

In some centers we noticed long lines of voters, apparently unregistered or unable to get to their correct voting locations, who were requesting official excuses ("*Certificados de Impedimiento*") in order to be exempt from non-voting penalties. Voters who were deemed unqualified for an excuse were given the address to submit an appeal, although at least one site ran out of the paper excuses, eliciting frustration from the voters. At this center, the police eventually intervened to protect TSE workers.

In accordance with regulations, several of the sites extended voting past the 4:00 PM deadline to accommodate voters in line when the polls officially closed. Once the polls closed, the vote-counting process at most of the *mesas* we observed was extremely transparent, with the *jurados* working together to open and display each ballot outward for those gathered nearby. If a mark on the ballot was not clear, the *jurados* discussed together what the intent of the voter was. We did not observe any heated arguments. The *jurados* worked diligently to make sure that their vote tallies for candidate or party matched the total number of votes cast. On the whole, despite some confusion, long lines, and understaffing, we were impressed with the orderly nature of the voting process.

VI. 2014 Election Results

Voter participation in the elections was high. Close to 92% of registered voters, and 91% of Bolivia's voting-age population, cast their ballots in the presidential contest. While a high participation rate is expected with compulsory voting, fewer than 6% of the ballots cast were blank or spoiled, suggesting that voters took their obligations seriously. Eighty-seven percent of all registered voters, and 86% of the voting-age population, also participated in the congressional elections.

Morales won the presidential election in a landslide with 61% of the vote, more than 35 percentage points ahead of the second-place candidate. The presidential vote was as follows:

- Evo Morales, Movement Towards Socialism/MAS	61.0%
- Samuel Doria Medina, United Democrats/UD	24.5%
- Jorge “Tuto” Quiroga, Christian Democrats/ PDC	9.1%
- Juan del Granado - Movement Without Fear, MSM	2.7%
- Fernando Vargas, Green Party (PVB)	2.7%

The MAS also won two-thirds of the seats in each legislative chamber, ensuring the “super-majority” needed for some types of legislation. This also provides the necessary votes for a proposed constitutional amendment, such as extending presidential term limits, which must then be ratified in a popular referendum. (To date, Morales has denied any interest in seeking re-election.)

Morales won the presidential vote in eight of the nine departments, including three of the four former bastions of conservative opposition in the eastern lowlands. This astounding feat demonstrated the true national reach achieved by the MAS and the apparent defeat of the political right—leading Morales to proclaim in his victory speech that the “*media luna*” has now been replaced by a “*luna llena*” (full moon) of a united Bolivia.

Due to their respective poor showings in achieving less than 3% of the vote, the two left-opposition parties (MSM and the Green Party) were decertified by the TSE and will not be represented in the Plurinational Assembly. Thanks to Bolivia’s new constitutional mandate for gender parity in the electoral system, women gained an unprecedented 48% of the legislative seats, placing Bolivia in the vanguard among Latin American countries and, indeed, among all the countries of the world. As a result of this election, representatives of social sectors that are historically or newly affiliated with MAS, including cooperative miners, coca growers, transportation unionists, peasants, and now business leaders, will dominate the new congress.

VII. Conclusion

In our [press release issued the day after the election](#), we commended the people of Bolivia for their robust participation in the democratic electoral process. Coming from the US where voter participation is extremely low, we admire the procedures in Bolivia that encourage nearly universal voter registration and active and informed citizen participation in the voting process. These include mandatory voting, Sunday voting, the ban on pre-electoral campaigning, the extension of voting rights and opportunities to citizens outside the country, and the requirement for gender parity at all levels of the electoral process.

As with virtually any voting process, we did observe several areas of concern. Although there are requirements for assisting elderly voters and those with disabilities, many voters with physical and mental challenges were forced to deal with impediments to voting. We also noted an unequal distribution of resources to polling centers on Election Day, with longer and more crowding and confusion at the less affluent polling sites. We observed centers with inadequate staff and technical capacity to deal with the large numbers of people who arrived but were unable to vote, or who required assistance to locate their voting tables.

Despite these concerns, we conclude that the elections were carried out competently and fairly. The results accurately reflect the will of the Bolivian people to re-elect Evo Morales to the presidency and to install a heavily MAS majority in the Legislative Assembly.

Morales's re-election to a third term highlights challenges for Bolivia's "process of change." While the MAS victory in eight of nine departments has led Morales to proclaim a united Bolivia, the political defeat of the right may have come at a cost—since it has occurred, in part, through the incorporation of significant right-wing elements under the MAS umbrella. A more centrist policy drift within the MAS could mean more government concessions to large-scale agricultural and timber interests, and a further slowdown of land reform, at the expense of lowland indigenous groups and highland peasant farmers.

The Morales government's reliance on extractive industries to finance the popular economic and social programs that brought about its massive electoral victory also poses a continuing challenge. The apparent revival of the TIPNIS highway plan and other controversial initiatives highlights the growing domestic cost of this strategy, as indigenous, environmental, and human rights groups increasingly confront Morales on extractivist development projects and policies. It is these ongoing struggles and contradictions—over local democracy, true gender equality, environmental protection, and the rights of indigenous and peasant communities—that will continue to shape Bolivia in the years to come.

The election results suggest that the people of Bolivia hope to see continuation and growth of the substantial gains already achieved under MAS leadership: reduced poverty; enhanced social mobility; more schools, housing, and hospitals; improved public transportation; greater access to public utilities; visible movement toward prosperity; and continued leadership in alternative political and economic institutions on the world stage.

APPENDIX A: Delegation Participants

Ann Fawcett Ambia is a retired public interest attorney, a peace & justice and environmental activist, and a member of the New York City NLG from Brooklyn.

Emily Achtenberg is an urban planner, affordable housing consultant, and independent researcher on Bolivian and Latin American social movements. She is the author of NACLA's *Rebel Currents* blog and a contributing writer to NACLA's *Report on the Americas*. She has served as an NLG election observer in El Salvador and Honduras and has participated in solidarity delegations to Chile, Bolivia, Oaxaca, Venezuela, and Cuba, among others.

Lauren Carasik is a Clinical Professor of Law and the Director of the International Human Rights Clinic at Western New England University School of Law.

Jessica Charniga is a lawyer working in New York and New Jersey. She volunteers as an NLG Legal Observer and is primarily interested in civil/human rights and immigration issues.

Betsy Cunningham is a semi-retired real estate attorney. Prior to this delegation she was in Uruguay, Bolivia, Columbia, and Brazil as a peace activist with Women in Black. She is an NLG member from Baltimore, Maryland.

Christina Kaufmann, J.D. has worked for the past five years as a teacher of ESL to refugees and farm workers and of literacy development for Spanish speakers in Michigan. She has been associated with the NLG since 1999.

Jamie Kearney is a paralegal, activist, and NLG member from Iowa City, Iowa.

Jack Laun is a semi-retired attorney who lives near Madison, Wisconsin. He is a co-founder of the Colombia Support Network (CSN), of which he is currently President. Through CSN he has worked on human rights issues in Latin America, particularly in Colombia, helping to create a network of chapters in US cities linked as sister communities.

Heidi Siegfried, Esq. is the Health Policy Director at the Center for Independence of the Disabled, New York and is Project Director of New Yorkers for Accessible Health Coverage. She is an NLG member from Brooklyn.

Judy Somberg is Chair of the NLG Task Force on the Americas. She has previously served as a National and Executive VP of the NLG and has been an electoral observer in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Venezuela, and the US. She practices family and estate law in Massachusetts.

Mark Sullivan is a semi-retired environmental attorney and adjunct professor from Santa Cruz, California working on promoting a greater understanding of human rights, environmental justice, and international policy in Latin America.

Thane Tienson is a trial lawyer in Portland, Oregon with a special interest in Latin America and international environmental law.

APPENDIX B: Delegation Meetings in Bolivia

1. Jim Shultz, Founder and Executive Director of the Democracy Center in Cochabamba.
2. Rocío Jiménez Alvarellós, an attorney, is one of six government appointed coordinators of the Cochabamba Departmental Electoral Commission.
3. Observed an election workers training in Cochabamba.
4. Manuel de la Fuente is the former director and currently on the faculty at Centro de Estudios Superiores Universitarios (CESU) de la Universidad Mayor de San Simón (UMSS), Cochabamba.
5. Godofredo Reinicke, former human rights ombudsman in the Chapare, is now a researcher, writer, and educator at Puente Investigación y Enlace, Cochabamba.
6. Kathryn Ledebur, Director of the Andean Information Network, Cochabamba.
7. Alberto Borda, a former Vice Minister of Planning, is the Cochabamba Department Representative in the Ministry of Autonomy.
8. Rafael Puente is a former Governor of the Department of Cochabamba and was Vice Minister for Security in the first Morales administration.
9. Toribia Lero Quispe is an activist with the indigenous organization CONAMAQ, Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas del Qullasuyu.
10. Marcela Olivera served as the key international liaison for the Coalition for the Defense of Water and Life during the Cochabamba water war. She is now Latin America Coordinator of Food and Water Watch.
11. Freddy Condo is a journalist and researcher currently working with Pacto de Unidad. He has also served as a representative of COINCABOL, Coordinadora de Organizaciones Indígenas, Compesinas y Comunidades Interculturales de Bolivia.
12. Carlos Arze Vargas is an economist at CEDLA, El Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo Laboral y Agrario, La Paz.
13. Pablo Poveda Ávila : research economist who has worked at CEDLA since 2001 in the natural resources unit. He has conducted students on hydrocarbons, mining, water, Brazil nut production, and forestry.
14. Félix Muruchi, a lawyer, teaches indigenous history at the Public University of El Alto and serves as a jilikat'a (leader) for his community of origin, Villa Apacheta in the department of Oruro.
15. Dr. Ramiro Bueno, Vice-Dean of the Faculty of Law and Political Science and the Program of Indigenous Law, UMSA, Universidad Mayor de San Andrés, La Paz; Dr. Liberio Uño, faculty in the Program of Indigenous Law; and various students in the Program of Indigenous Law.
16. Dr. Milton Mendoza, attorney, was a former prosecutor, now a litigator and an alternate judge on the Constitutional Court of the Supreme Court (Magistrado Suplente del Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional).
17. Ely Lopez is a consultant on environmental issues. She formerly worked with the Oruro-based Colectivo CASA – Colectivo de Coordinación de Acciones Socio Ambientales.
18. Xavier Albó, an anthropologist and writer, was founder of the rural development program, CIPCA, Centro de Investigación y Promoción del Campesinado.
19. Election observer training under the auspices of the Tribunal Supremo Electoral.